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ABSTRACT
Estimates using admissions lotteries suggest that urban charter schools boost student achievement,
while charter schools in other settings do not. We explore student-level and school-level explanations
for these differences using a large sample of Massachusetts charter schools. Our results show that
urban charter schools boost achievement well beyond ambient non-charter levels (that is, the average
achievement level for urban non-charter students), and beyond non-urban achievement in math. Student
demographics explain some of these gains since urban charters are most effective for non-whites and
low-baseline achievers. At the same time, non-urban charter schools are uniformly ineffective. Our
estimates also reveal important school-level heterogeneity in the urban charter sample. A non-lottery
analysis suggests that urban schools with binding, well-documented admissions lotteries generate larger
score gains than under-subscribed urban charter schools with poor lottery records. We link the magnitude
of charter impacts to distinctive pedagogical features of urban charters such as the length of the school
day and school philosophy. The relative effectiveness of urban lottery-sample charters is accounted




















A growing body of evidence suggests that urban charter schools have the potential to generate
impressive achievement gains, especially for minority students living in high-poverty areas. In a
series of studies using admissions lotteries to identify causal eects, we looked at the impact of
charter attendance in Boston and at a KIPP school in Lynn, Massachusetts (Abdulkadiro glu et
al., 2009, 2011; Angrist et al., 2010a, 2010b). Boston and Lynn charter middle schools increase
student achievement by about 0.2 standard deviations () per year in English Language Arts
(ELA) and about 0.4 per year in math, relative to traditional public schools. Among high
school students, attendance at a Boston charter school increases student achievement by about
0.2 per year in ELA and 0.3 per year in math. Outside of Massachusetts, lottery studies
of charter schools in the Harlem Children's Zone (Dobbie and Fryer, 2011) and a Washington
DC charter boarding school (Curto and Fryer, 2011) document similarly large gains. Studies of
Chicago and New York charter schools also report positive eects (Hoxby and Rocko, 2004;
Hoxby, Murarka and Kang, 2009).
While these results are encouraging, they come from schools operating in traditional (for
charters) urban settings. Although interest in charter schools is growing in school districts
outside central cities (see, e.g., the discussion of New York area charters in Hu, 2011), results
for more diverse sets of charter schools are also more mixed. In a recent report evaluating
roughly two dozen Massachusetts charter schools from around the state, we nd little evidence
of achievement gains at schools outside of high-poverty urban areas (Angrist et al., 2011). Some
of the estimates for non-urban Massachusetts charters show signicant negative eects. These
results echo ndings from a multi-state study of 36 charter middle schools using admissions
lotteries (Gleason et al., 2010). Here too, charter schools outside of urban areas seem to do little
for achievement, though, as in our earlier work, urban schools with high-minority, high-poverty
enrollment generate some gains. Other studies using statistical controls rather than entrance
lotteries also document heterogeneity in the eects of charter schools. Hoxby (2004) and Zimmer
et al. (2009) nd that newly opened schools are less eective than older schools. Imberman
(2011) reports that among charter schools in a large urban school district in the Southwest,
schools that began as charters have large eects on discipline and attendance, while converted
schools do not.
Our analysis focuses on heterogeneity in the eects of charter schools across demographic
groups and between urban and non-urban areas. This breakdown is motivated by our earlier
ndings for Massachusetts, and by research showing similarly heterogeneous eects for other
education alternatives. Using data on cohorts of students graduating in the early 1980s, Evans
and Schwab (1995) and Neal (1997) show that Catholic school attendance leads to increases
2in high school graduation and college attendance. Both studies nd larger benets for black
students and for students in urban settings. Grogger et al. (2000) and Altonji et al. (2005)
report similar results on Catholic schooling for more recent cohorts. For example, Grogger et
al. report that Catholic high school attendance increases the probability of graduation by 18 to
24 percentage points for urban minority students; estimates for other groups are less than 10
percentage points and mostly insignicant.
The analysis here reveals similar heterogeneity for charter schools in Massachusetts and
develops a framework for interpreting this heterogeneity using both student- and school-level
explanatory variables. We begin with a semiparametric analysis of heterogeneous potential
outcomes that assigns a role to variation in no-treatment counterfactuals and to charter ap-
plicants' demographic characteristics and baseline scores. This investigation also includes a
Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) style decomposition of the urban charter advantage.
We then turn to an analysis that attempts to isolate school-level characteristics that might
explain dierences in charter school eectiveness. Our school-level investigation of charter eect
heterogeneity is built on a set of observational (i.e., non-lottery) estimates that rely on statistical
controls to eliminate selection bias. We show that in the sample of schools for which lotteries
can be used to capture causal eects, the observational analysis does a good job of replicating
lottery-based ndings. At the same time, the observational analysis suggests that the sample of
urban schools for which a lottery-based analysis is feasible, that is, over-subscribed schools with
good historical lottery records, boost scores more than other urban charter schools. Our school-
level analysis explains the dierence in eectiveness between lottery and non-lottery schools as
well as the urban charter advantage.
The next section details school participation, describes the data, and outlines our empirical
strategy for the lottery analysis. Section III presents the ndings that motivate our investi-
gation of charter eect heterogeneity. Section IV outlines the econometric framework used to
investigate this heterogeneity and reports the results of our investigation. These results show
that students at urban charters in the lottery sample are typical of the urban student popula-
tion, and that urban charter attendance boosts achievement well beyond ambient non-charter
levels. Student demographics and baseline scores play a role in this { urban schools work best
for minority students and students with low baseline scores { but non-urban charters are largely
ineective. Section V compares observational and lottery-based estimates in the subsample for
which a lottery-based analysis is possible and discusses a school-level analysis of the observa-
tional estimates. Urban and lottery-sample charter eectiveness can be explained by adherence
to a No Excuses approach to urban education that emphasizes instruction time, comportment,
and focuses on traditional math and reading skills. Conditional on No Excuses status, factors
such as time in school and teacher characteristics have little predictive value for school-specic
3eects. Finally, consistent with the No Excuses explanation of the urban charter advantage, we
show that urban charter attendance boosts the likelihood that charter applicants are subject to
disciplinary action, while non-urban charter attendance has no eect on this outcome.
II Lottery Analysis: Data and Empirical Strategy
We attempted to collect lottery data for the set of Massachusetts charter schools serving middle
and high school grades and meeting a set of pre-specied eligibility criteria.1 The school selection
process is detailed in Table 1. To be eligible for our analysis, schools had to accept students
in the relevant entry grades (4th-7th grade for middle school and 9th grade for high school).
We excluded closed schools and alternative schools serving non-traditional populations (usually
students at risk of dropping out). We also excluded schools that opened after the 2009-2010
school year. The resulting set of eligible schools includes 27 of the 54 charters serving middle
school grades and eight of 37 schools serving high school grades.2 Three eligible schools serve
both middle and high school grades, so there are 32 eligible campuses.3 Some eligible schools
are not included in the lottery analysis; some were under-subscribed, while others failed to
keep sucient lottery records. The nal sample of over-subscribed schools with usable records
includes 16 middle schools and six high schools. These schools are listed in Table A1. Nine of
the lottery-study participating middle schools are in urban areas, with seven of these in Boston,
one inside Interstate Highway 495, and one near the Rhode Island border. The other seven are
in non-urban areas, three in the center of the state, one on Cape Cod, two inside I-495, and one
near the New Hampshire border. Four participating high schools are in Boston. One non-urban
high school in the lottery sample is on Cape Cod, and the other is near Springeld.
Much of our analysis focuses on dierences between charter schools in urban and non-urban
areas. This distinction is motivated by the evidence, reported here and elsewhere, that charter
schools serving heavily minority, high-poverty student populations in urban areas are more likely
to boost achievement than are other sorts of charter schools, and by similar ndings for Catholic
schools (Gleason et al., 2010; Grogger et al., 2000).4 To document dierences in charter school
1We focus on middle and high schools because data for elementary school lotteries are much less widely
available. Moreover, pre-lottery test scores { a key component of the observational analysis { are unavailable for
elementary school applicants.
2Many charters extend through the high school grades but do not have entrance lotteries for high school.
3Schools are classied as both middle and high if they have entrance lotteries at both levels, or if lottery
records at the middle school level were available early enough for participants to be observed in high school. Our
universe includes 69 unique schools.
4We dene urban areas to be those in which the local district superintendent participates in the Massachusetts
Urban Superintendents Network. In our sample, the distinction between urban and non-urban charter schools is
essentially identical to splits based on fraction eligible for free lunch or fraction minority.
4practices across areas, we surveyed the full set of eligible charter schools, regardless of the
quality of their lottery records. Among 32 eligible schools, 28 school administrators completed
this survey; we received a total of 30 responses since two surveyed schools are eligible at both
the middle and high school levels.
Our survey revealed important dierences between urban and non-urban charter schools.
Table 2 summarizes the survey responses. Urban schools are younger than non-urban schools;
in Spring 2010, the average urban school had been open for 8.2 years, while the average non-
urban school had been open for 11.4 years. Urban charter schools also run a longer school day
and year than do non-urban schools. The average urban charter year lasts 189 days and has a
school day of 464 minutes, compared to 183 days and 422 minutes at non-urban schools. The
additional time appears to go to increased math and reading instruction; urban schools spend
35 extra minutes per day on math and 40 extra minutes per day on reading. Urban charter
schools are also 38 percent more likely to have Saturday school.
Our survey also covers aspects of school philosophy and organization. Urban charter schools
are more likely than non-urban charters to require parents to sign a contract (82 percent com-
pared to 46 percent), to require students to sign a contract (71 percent compared to 55 percent),
and to use uniforms (88 percent compared to 73 percent). Urban charter schools are also much
more likely to use a formal reward and punishment system to shape student behavior; 65 per-
cent of urban schools use such a system, while only 18 percent of non-urban schools do so. The
survey results reveal a sharp division between urban and non-urban charters with respect to
the No Excuses approach to education. As discussed by Thernstrom and Thernstrom (2003)
and Carter (2000), No Excuses principles include a strict disciplinary environment, an emphasis
on student behavior and comportment, extended time in school, and an intensive focus on tra-
ditional reading and math skills. Seventy-one percent of urban charter administrators identify
somewhat or fully with No Excuses, while no non-urban charter identies with this approach.
The bottom rows of Table 2 compare the inputs and resources used by urban and non-urban
charter schools. Urban schools are more likely to be eligible for Title I status and have somewhat
higher per-pupil expenditures than non-urban charter schools ($14,095 compared to $11,090).
On the other hand, student/teacher ratios at urban and non-urban charters are similar. Urban
schools have younger teachers as measured by proportions under age 32 and over age 49, and are
more likely to hire paid tutors to work with their students. Teacher departures, requirements
to take student calls after hours, and the use of unpaid tutors and volunteers are similar across
the two types of schools.
5Student Data
The student-level data used in our analysis comes from an administrative record-keeping sys-
tem with complete coverage of the students enrolled in Massachusetts' public schools.5 Our
coverage period runs from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2009-2010 school year. The
administrative records include information on student race/ethnicity, gender, special education
status, limited English prociency status, free/reduced-price lunch status, town of residence,
and school(s) of attendance, as well as raw and scaled scores on Massachusetts Comprehen-
sive Assessment System (MCAS) exams. The MCAS is a set of high-stakes standardized tests
given to students in Massachusetts' public schools in grades 3 through 8 and 10. The primary
outcomes analyzed in our study are MCAS scores in math and English Language Arts (ELA).
Outcomes are post-lottery test scores in grades 4 through 8 for middle school and 10 for high
school. The data appendix provides details on the availability of outcomes for each applicant
cohort. For the purposes of this project, raw MCAS scores were standardized to have mean zero
and standard deviation one by subject, grade level, and year.
Our data processing protocol assigns students to a single school for every year they appear
in the data, even if they attended more than one school in a given year. Typically, students
appearing on the roster of more than one school were assigned to the school they attended
longest, though students with any time in a charter school in a given year are coded as having
been a charter student for the year. If a student attended more than one charter, the student
was assigned to the charter he or she attended the longest.
The analysis sample for the lottery study was constructed by matching applicant records from
the 16 participating middle schools and six participating high schools to administrative records
using applicants' name, year, and grade. Where available, information on date of birth, town of
residence, race/ethnicity, and gender was used to break ties. Ninety-two percent of applicants
were matched. Applicants were excluded from the lottery analysis if they were disqualied
from the lottery they entered (this mostly aected applicants to the wrong grade level). We
also dropped siblings of current students, late applicants, and out-of-area applicants.6 Students
missing baseline demographic information in the state database were dropped as well.
5This is known as the Student Information Management System, or SIMS. See the data appendix for details.
6Charter schools typically give priority to sibling applicants, as well as to students in the local school district
(or sometimes region) in which they are located. Our applicant risk sets (discussed in the next section) distinguish
between in-area and out-of-area applicants for schools that take substantial numbers of both. At schools with
fewer than ve out-of-area applicants, those out-of-area were dropped.
6Descriptive Statistics
We begin with a statistical picture of the Massachusetts student population in traditional public
and charter schools. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for students enrolled in traditional
public schools, students enrolled in eligible charter schools, and the sample of students who
applied to oversubscribed charters participating in the lottery study, separately for urban and
non-urban areas. Traditional schools are dened as those that are not charters, alternative,
special education, exam, or magnet schools. For the six groups described in the table, we
report average demographic characteristics, program participation rates, and average baseline
test scores. Baseline scores are from 4th grade for middle school and 8th grade for high school.
Traditional urban students look very dierent from traditional students in the rest of the
state. Specically, urban students are more likely to be black or Hispanic, to be English language
learners (or of limited English prociency, LEP), to participate in special education, and to
receive a subsidized lunch. Urban students also have much lower baseline test scores than other
public school students: urban students score 0:43 and 0:46 below the state average on math
and ELA tests at the middle school level, respectively, and they score 0:42 and 0:39 below the
average at the high school level. In contrast, non-urban students score 0:21 and 0:23 above
the average at the middle school level; the corresponding non-urban advantages in high school
are 0:27 and 0:28.
Eligible charter school students who live in urban and non-urban areas are more similar
to their peers in regular public schools than to one another. There are, however, important
dierences by charter status as well. Urban charter schools serve a much higher fraction of black
students than do urban public schools. Urban charter students are also less likely to be limited
English procient, to participate in special education, or to qualify for subsidized lunch. Charter
school students in both urban and non-urban areas have slightly higher baseline test scores than
their public school counterparts. Applicants to charter schools with observed entrance lotteries
are similar to the population of enrolled charter students in both urban and non-urban areas.
Empirical Strategy
The lottery-based identication strategy captures causal eects for applicants to over-subscribed
charters with high quality lottery records. The second-stage equation in this context is




i + sigt + igt; (1)
where yigt is a test score for student i in grade g in year t, 2t and 2g are year and grade
eects, Xi is a vector of pre-lottery demographic characteristics (race, special education, limited
7English prociency, subsidized lunch status, and a female-minority interaction), and igt repre-
sents random uctuations in test scores. The set of dij includes a separate dummy variable for
every combination of observed charter school lotteries (indexed by j) entered by students in the
lottery sample. In what follows, we refer to these as \risk sets." The variable of interest, sigt,
measures years spent in charter schools between application and test dates.7 The parameter 
captures the causal eect of charter school attendance.
OLS estimates of equation (1) may be biased because students do not choose to attend
charter schools randomly. We therefore use a dummy variable, Zi, indicating lottery oers as
an instrument for time spent in charter school. The rst stage for our 2SLS procedure is




i + Zi + igt; (2)
where  is the eect of a lottery oer on charter attendance. As in the second stage equation,
the rst stage includes risk set controls and baseline demographic characteristics, as well as year
and grade eects. Over-identied models introduce risk-set-specic rst-stage eects (jdijZi).
Because lottery oers are randomly assigned within risk sets, they are likely to be indepen-
dent of family background, student ability or motivation, and any other unobserved charac-
teristics of charter applicants. The appendix presents evidence in support of our lottery-based
identication strategy. Specically, Table A2 shows that conditional on risk set, winning the
lottery is uncorrelated with student characteristics, which suggests that randomization was suc-
cessful. Table A3 shows that we nd followup scores for 91 percent of middle school applicants
and 78 percent of high school applicants. In middle school, we are one percent more likely to
nd followup scores for lottery winners, but this imbalance is unlikely to explain the treatment
eects discussed below.
Equations (1) and (2) describe a just-identied system with one endogenous variable and
one instrument. The 2SLS estimate of  can be obtained by taking the ratio of the reduced
form eect of Zi on yigt and the rst stage eect of Zi on sigt. The reduced form has the same
data structure and regressors as equation (2), replacing sigt with yigt on the left-hand side. In
an eort to increase the precision of our estimates, we also estimate overidentied models that
allow the rst stage eect to vary by risk set. In regressions for high school, only 10th grade test
scores are included, and we cluster standard errors at the school-grade-year level. In regressions
for middle school, we include the full set of non-repeat post-lottery test scores through 8th grade
and add a second layer of clustering at the student level.
7Our denition of sigt includes years spent at any charter school, including those without available lottery
records. This specication is based on a simple benchmark with homogeneous treatment eects across charter
schools. We investigate school-level heterogeneity in Section V.
8Dierences in eectiveness between urban and non-urban charter schools are a primary focus
of our analysis, so we also generate separate estimates for these two groups. These estimates
are produced using equations of the form






igt + igt; (3)
where su
igt and sn
igt are years in urban and non-urban charter schools. The rst stage for urban
attendance can be written
su






i + igt; (4)
where Zu
i and Zn
i indicate oers from urban and non-urban lotteries, with a similar specication
for non-urban attendance.
III Lottery Estimates
Charter school lottery oers increase the average duration of charter school attendance sharply.
The rst stage estimates reported in column (1) of Table 4 show that among applicants to
charter middle schools, students who win a charter school lottery spend about 1 more year in a
charter before being tested than do students not oered a seat. Applicants who win high school
lotteries spend about half a year more attending a charter school than applicants who lose the
lottery before taking MCAS tests. These rst stage estimates are similar to those reported in
Abdulkadiro glu et al. (2011) for a smaller sample of charter schools in Boston.
Middle school lottery winners outscore lottery losers by 0:06 in ELA and 0:21 in math.
These reduced form estimates can be seen in column (2) of Table 4. High school lottery winners
outperform lottery losers by about 0.11 in ELA, 0.16 in math, 0.16 in Writing Composition,
and 0.14 in Writing Topic Development. These estimates, like the middle school results, are
precisely estimated and signicantly dierent from zero.
Because the middle school rst stage is close to one, middle school 2SLS estimates dier little
from the corresponding reduced form estimates. The estimates shown in column (3) of Table 4
imply that a year of attendance at a lottery sample charter middle school increases ELA scores
by 0:07 and math scores by 0:21. Column (4) reports 2SLS estimates from overidentied
models that include a full set of risk set and oer interactions as instruments. The results here
are close to the just-identied estimates in column (3), though estimates from the overidentied
models are slightly more precise.
The high school 2SLS estimates imply larger causal eects than those found for middle
schools. The score gains generated by time spent in charter high schools are on the order of
90.22 per year for ELA and 0.32 per year for math. Writing gains also are estimated to be
substantial; a year of charter attendance increases Writing Topic scores by 0:30 and Writing
Composition scores by 0:27. As in middle school, the high school results from overidentied
models are close to the corresponding just identied estimates.
Estimates for the pooled state sample mask considerable heterogeneity by school type, a
pattern documented in Table 5. Although rst stage eects at urban and non-urban middle
schools are similar, second stage middle school estimates dier sharply. The 2SLS estimates for
urban middle schools, reported in column (3) of Table 5, suggest these schools generate gains
of about 0.14 in ELA and 0.34 in math per year. By contrast, the estimates for non-urban
charter middle schools are negative. In particular, as can be seen in column (6), charter students
at non-urban middle schools are estimated to lose ground relative to their public school peers
at a rate of 0.16 per year in both ELA and math. Not surprisingly, the high school lottery
results for urban schools are similar to the statewide results (since only two of the high schools
in the state sample are non-urban). The 2SLS estimates for non-urban charter high schools are
uniformly negative, but too imprecise to be conclusive.
Subgroup variation in charter eects is documented in Tables 6 and 7, separately for urban
and non-urban schools. These tables report the results of estimating equation (3) by 2SLS in
various subsamples of students. Urban charter schools boost scores for most subgroups, though
not uniformly. Girls realize larger gains in math, while boys see larger ELA gains. Black and
Hispanic students benet considerably from urban charter attendance in middle school, but the
estimated math gains for whites are smaller and there is no increase in whites' ELA scores.
Urban charter middle schools appear to produce especially large achievement gains for students
eligible for a subsidized lunch and for those with low baseline scores. Attendance at urban
charter high schools increases math scores in every group and raises reading scores for everyone
except whites, though positive high school eects on reading are not always signicantly dierent
from zero.
Non-urban charter attendance fails to raise scores for any of the subgroups examined in
Table 7, apparently reducing achievement for girls, whites, and students with low baseline scores.
Estimates for black and Hispanic students are not signicantly dierent from zero. A year of
non-urban charter middle school reduces free-lunch students' ELA scores by 0:20, and reduces
math scores in this group by 0:17, though the latter estimate is not statistically signicant.
Most of the estimates for non-urban high school charters are negative, though eects here are
imprecise (estimates for black and Hispanic students are omitted due to small samples sizes in
these non-urban groups).
10IV Dierences in Students
We investigate student- and school-level explanations for the striking dierence in causal eects
at urban and non-urban charter schools. The student-level analysis is cast in a semiparamet-
ric framework with heterogeneous potential outcomes, indexed against a Bernoulli treatment,
Di 2 f0;1g, to indicate charter attendance. The Bernoulli setup focuses on heterogeneity while
abstracting from nonlinearities that seem second-order in this context (since the rst stage eects
of lottery oers are similar in the two settings for middle school, yet the eects there dier most
dramatically). Let Y1i and Y0i denote potential test scores for student i in and out of charter
schools, and let Ui 2 fu;ng indicate residence in an urban or non-urban area. The observed
outcome for student i is
Yi = Y0i + (Y1i   Y0i)Di:
In other words, we observe Y0i for applicants who don't go to charter school and Y1i for those
who do.
Although our empirical work uses data from many lotteries, the analysis of heterogeneity is
explained with reference to a single lottery. Oers in this lottery are indicated by Zi, as before.
Potential treatment assignments, denoted D1i and D0i, tell us whether student i attends a
charter school if he wins or loses the lottery. Oers are randomly assigned and assumed to aect
test scores only through charter attendance, so the potential outcome vector (Y1i;Y0i;D1i;D0i)
is independent of Zi. We also assume that winning an entrance lottery can only make charter
attendance more likely, so that D1i  D0i 8i, with strict inequality for some students.
Under these assumptions, instrumental variables estimation using Zi as an instrument for Di
in the sample of lottery applicants produces a local average treatment eect (LATE; Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). Here, LATE is the eect of charter attendance for students induced to enroll in
a charter school by winning an admissions lottery (the compliers, who have D1i > D0i). When
computed separately for urban and non-urban students, IV estimates identify
l 
El[YijZi = 1]   El[YijZi = 0]
El[DijZi = 1]   El[DijZi = 0]
= El[Y1i   Y0ijD1i > D0i]; l 2 fu;ng;
where l indexes location and El denotes an expectation over students in location l. This is LATE
in each setting.
We analyze three sources of student-level heterogeneity that might account for the dierence
between u and n. The rst is the urban/non-urban dierence in treated and non-treated
counterfactuals (that is, distinct dierences in average Y1i and Y0i). This investigation tells us
whether the urban charter advantage reects high scores in the treated state, low non-treated
11outcomes, or both. The second is variation in Y0i across charter and non-charter students
within each area. This tells us whether lottery compliers are unusual in either setting. Finally,
we decompose the dierence in charter eectiveness across urban and non-urban areas into a
component due to dierences in student populations and a component due to dierences in
eectiveness conditional on characteristics.
The Urban Gap in Treatment and No-Treatment Counterfactuals
The urban charter advantage can be broken down into two parts, the rst capturing dierences in
potential outcomes in the treated state (dierences in Y1i) and the second capturing dierences
in potential outcomes in the non-treated state (dierences in Y0i). Specically, we have








Here, 1 measures the dierence in treated outcomes for compliers at urban and non-urban
charter schools, while 0 measures the dierence in non-treated outcomes between these two
groups.
Pooling urban and non-urban charter applicants, we estimate 0 using
Yi(1   Di) =  (1   Di) + 0(1   Di)  1fUi = ug +
X
j
jdij + i; (6)
with rst stage






jdijZi + i: (7)
The rst stage equation for the interaction between 1   Di and urban status uses the same
specication as equation (7).8 For a model without covariates, Abadie (2003) shows that 2SLS
estimation of this type of system produces estimates of marginal mean counterfactuals for com-
pliers; in this case, the 2SLS estimate is the mean of Y0i for compliers. (We estimate 1 using
a model that replaces (1   Di) with Di in equations (6) and (7).) Our parameterization diers
from Abadie's in two ways. First, we are interested in the dierence in marginal mean outcomes
between urban and non-urban compliers:   equals the average of Y0i for lottery compliers in
non-urban areas, while   + 0 is the average of Y0i for compliers in urban areas. Second, our
estimating equation includes a saturated model for risk sets. In this case, the 2SLS estimands
are weighted averages of mean Y0i for compliers across risk sets, with weights proportional to
8Since applicants to urban and non-urban charter schools are disjoint sets, the main eect for urban status is
collinear with the dij and therefore omitted.
12the variance of the rst-stage tted values in the risk set (this is a consequence of Theorem 3 in
Angrist and Imbens 1995).9
Our analysis of counterfactuals is limited to middle schools since the sample of non-urban
high school charter students is too small to produce useful estimates of 1 and 0. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 8 show 2SLS estimates of urban and non-urban charter eects using scores one
year after application. Column (3), which reports u   n, shows that the dierence in charter
eects by urban status is 0:37 in ELA and 0:72 in math. Columns (4) and (5) show that
dierences in non-charter fallback can account for the full urban charter advantage in math and
most of the advantage in ELA. The estimates of 0 imply that in public schools, non-urban
compliers outscore urban compliers by 0:71 in ELA and 0:63 in math. In charter schools,
non-urban compliers outscore urban compliers by only 0:33 in ELA, and urban compliers score
0:09 higher in math (though this estimate is not statistically signicant).
Figure 1 presents a schematic representation of the results in Table 8. Urban charter middle
schools serve populations with very low non-charter achievement, well below that of students in
non-urban charters. The charter treatment pulls these students up to a level close to that of
non-urban students (beyond these students in math, below them in ELA). Thus, it seems fair to
see urban gains as recovery from a low base, though as we show next, this level is typical of all
urban students in the state. By contrast, while non-urban charter students start out well ahead
of their urban counterparts, the non-urban charter treatment pulls them back.
Non-treated Gaps in Urban and Non-urban Areas
Instead of comparing the no-treatment outcomes of urban compliers to the corresponding out-
comes of non-urban compliers, we can benchmark achievement in each area using the local
non-charter mean. This tells us whether the urban charter advantage is driven by unusually low
no-treatment outcomes for compliers, or whether urban lottery compliers are, in fact, typical
of their milieu. Figure 2 illustrates the alternative scenarios we have in mind: the left panel
describes a situation in which the achievement of untreated urban students is comparable to
ambient non-charter achievement, while the right panel describes a situation in which the urban
fallback is unusually low.
The econometric analysis of within-area counterfactuals begins with a decomposition of urban











E[Y0ijD1i > D0i;dij = 1]
where NU is the set of non-urban lotteries and Nj is the number of students in risk set j.
13and non-urban LATE as follows:









; l 2 fu;ng:
The term l
0 is the dierence in average Y0i between lottery compliers and the general population
of non-charter students in the relevant area. The term l
1 is the dierence between the treated
outcomes of compliers and ambient non-charter achievement. In urban schools, for example,
large u
1 and small u
0 mean that urban charters push their students beyond typical non-charter
achievement in cities.
The decomposition in (8) is estimated using equations of the form
Yi(1   Di) = (1   Di) +
X
j
jdij + i; (9)
estimated separately for urban and non-urban students, with the same rst stage specication as
equation (7). Here, the 2SLS estimand is a weighted average of Y0i for lottery compliers across
risk sets. To estimate E[Y0ijDi = 0;Ui = l], we omit risk set controls and estimate equation
(9) by OLS in a sample of students that includes both applicants and non-applicants. The OLS
estimand is thus a simple average of Yi for non-charter students in location l. Assuming that
mean Y0i is constant across risk sets for compliers, l
0 is the dierence between the 2SLS and
OLS estimates of . l
1 is estimated by replacing (1   Di) with Di in equation (9).10
Estimates of equation (9) for urban middle and high schools appear in Table 9. Columns (2)-
(4) show results from regressions that include non-applicants. Specically, column (2) reports
the average Y0i for non-charter students, while column (3) shows u
0, the dierence in average
outcomes for compliers and non-charter students. Estimates of u
1, the dierence between the
treated outcomes of urban compliers and the ambient level of urban achievement, appear in
column 4.11 The estimates of u
0 suggest that urban lottery compliers are positively selected
from the urban middle school population, but the estimated gaps are small, and marginally
10Standard errors for the dierence between the 2SLS and OLS estimates were constructed using a stacked
data set that includes two copies of each observation. Let h 2 f1;2g index halves of the data, and dene
Eihk = 1fh = kg for k 2 f1;2g. We estimate
Yih(1   Dih) = 2SLS  (1   Dih)  Eih1 + OLS  (1   Dih)  Eih2 +   Eih2 +
X
j
j  dij  Eih1 + ih;
instrumenting ((1 Dih)Eih1) with (Zih Eih1), and clustering standard errors by i as well as school-grade-year.
11Middle school scores are from the year after the lottery for applicants and 6th grade for non-applicants; high
school scores are from 10th grade as always.
14signicant only for middle school ELA (u
0 for high school is virtually zero in both subjects).
Because urban charter compliers have non-charter achievement levels that are fairly typical
of students in urban areas, the large score gains generated by urban charter schools can be
attributed to high scores in the treated state.
The last three columns of Table 9 compare the scores of urban compliers with a non-charter
benchmark computed excluding students who do not apply to charter schools. The resulting
estimates of u
0, reported in column (6), are even smaller than those in column (3). Thus, among
applicants to charter schools, the non-charter achievement levels of compliers and non-attenders
are virtually identical. Urban charter schools therefore push the scores of compliers well beyond
the average non-charter achievement levels of all of their applicants.
Table 10 reports estimates of n
0 and n
1 for students at non-urban middle schools. As in
urban areas, the non-charter achievement level of non-urban compliers is slightly higher than
that of students in the surrounding public schools. The ELA scores of non-urban compliers
in public schools exceed the ambient non-urban achievement level by a statistically signicant
0:12, while the estimate of n
1 for ELA is a precisely estimated  0:08. This implies that non-
urban charter middle schools move their students from atypically high ELA achievement levels
down to levels that are slightly below those of non-charter non-urban students. Non-charter
math achievement of non-urban compliers is statistically indistinguishable from the ambient
non-charter level, while non-urban charter attendance pulls compliers 0:19 below the non-
charter mean. As with urban applicants, the average level of Y0i for non-urban compliers is very
close to that of applicants who do not attend charter schools; both estimates of n
0 reported in
column (6) are statistically insignicant and small. Since positive selection on Y0i is reduced
when non-applicants are excluded, the estimates of n
1 in column 7 show sharper declines than
the corresponding estimates including non-applicants in column 4.
Combined with the estimates of 0 and 1 in Table 8, these results paint a consistent picture
of the urban charter advantage. Urban middle school charters push the scores of their students
from a typically low level up to a level much closer to the average level of achievement among
non-urban charter students (the scenario sketched in the left panel of Figure 2). Non-urban
charter middle schools reduce the scores of their students, in some cases markedly so. The
non-urban high school sample is too small for precise comparisons of the outcomes of urban
and non-urban compliers, but the results for urban charter high schools look broadly similar
to those for middle schools: charter high schools raise the scores of urban students by pushing
them beyond the level of high school achievement typical of urban areas.
15Accounting for Student Demographics
We explore the role of student demographics in generating the urban charter advantage with
the help of a decomposition in the spirit of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). The rst step
uses the methods of Abadie (2003) to identify a linear local average response function for lottery
compliers conditional on a vector of observable demographic variables, Xi. Specically, we have
El[YijD1i > D0i;Di;Xi;dij] = X0




jdij; l 2 fu;ng: (10)
This equation has a causal interpretation because conditional on being a complier, treatment
(charter enrollment) is ignorable. Abadie (2003) shows that 2SLS using Bernoulli instruments
for a Bernoulli treatment consistently estimates this sort of linear model for local average causal
response.
Equation (10) generates the following parameterization of the urban/non-urban dierence
in charter school attendance eects:
u   n = (!u   !n) +  X0
n(u   n) + (  X0
u    X0
n)u; (11)
where
 Xl  El[XijD1i > D0i]:
The last term in equation (11) captures the part of the urban charter advantage explained by
dierences in demographics. In particular, this term tells us how much smaller the eects of
urban charter schools would be if they served the same mix of students as do non-urban schools.
The rst two terms capture the component of the urban advantage attributable to dierences
in eects within demographic groups.
Here, as always, Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions can be presented in two ways. In this case,
the urban/non-urban dierence in charter school eects can be decomposed with dierences in
means weighted by non-urban charter impacts instead of urban. Specically, we can write
u   n = (!u   !n) +  X0
u(u   n) + (  X0
u    X0
n)n: (12)
Like equation (11), this expression includes components associated with dierences in demo-
graphics and dierences in eectiveness conditional on demographics. The last term measures
how much more eective non-urban charter schools would be if their students were demograph-
ically similar to the urban charter population.
We construct these decompositions by estimating
Yi = X0





16by 2SLS, separately for urban and non-urban applicants, with rst stage
Di = X0




jdij + i (13)
for Di and similar rst stages for interaction terms involving Di. The covariate vector, Xi,
includes sex, race, special education status, limited English prociency status, free lunch status,
and dummies for performance at the advanced, procient, or needs improvement level on baseline
math and ELA tests.12 Complier means for each component of Xi are estimated using the kappa-
weighting procedure described in Abadie (2003).
Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions suggest that favorable demographics enhance urban charter
eectiveness, but dierences in student populations do not fully account for the urban charter
advantage. This can be seen in Table 11, which reports the components of equations (11) and
(12) for middle schools. (The non-urban high school samples are too small to admit meaningful
investigations of eect heterogeneity using this approach.) Column (1) shows the dierence in
charter middle school treatment eects by urban status.13 Columns (2) and (3) report the com-
ponents of decomposition (11), which multiplies the urban/non-urban dierence in demographics
by treatment eects for urban schools. Column (2) shows how urban eectiveness might change
if urban schools were to serve the non-urban population. These results suggest that 63 percent
of the urban advantage in ELA (0.25/0.40) can be explained by student demographics. The
corresponding estimate for math is 49 percent. Urban schools are especially eective for poor
and minority students, and they serve more of these students than do non-urban schools. On the
other hand, column (3) shows that even with the same student mix as non-urban charter schools,
urban charters would be more eective than non-urban charters, especially in math. The urban
charter advantage can therefore be attributed to a combination of student demographics and
larger treatment eects within demographic groups.
At the same time, columns (4) and (5), which report the results of estimating decomposition
(12) using non-urban treatment eects to load covariate dierences, show that the urban char-
ter advantage would shrink little if non-urban schools served an urban demographic: student
characteristics account for only 14 percent (0.06/0.40) and 37 percent (0.25/0.68) of the urban
advantages in ELA and math, respectively. The results here are much less precise than those
based on decomposition (11), reecting the fact that n is estimated less precisely than u. Still,
this juxtaposition provides a useful summary of the underlying nding that non-urban charter
schools are largely ineective across subgroups.
12These score categories are used to determine whether schools in Massachusetts meet the Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) standard under No Child Left Behind (NCLB).
13These dierences dier slightly from those reported in Table 8 because equation (13) imposes rst stage
coecients that are constant across risk sets, while the earlier estimates allow the rst stage coecients to vary.
17V Dierences in Schools
Our exploration of school-level heterogeneity in achievement eects is founded on observational
estimates. Specically, controlling for observable student characteristics, we estimate nonexper-
imental treatment eects for every eligible charter school in the state (that is, for middle and
high schools serving traditional students, open during the relevant time period, and meeting
the entry grade restrictions described in Section II). This observational identication strategy
is rst validated by comparing observational and lottery-based estimates in the lottery sample.
The validated observational analysis serves two purposes. First, an observational identica-
tion strategy allows us to compare eects for eligible charter schools with and without lottery
records. If oversubscribed schools with usable lottery records dier systematically from other
schools, then our lottery analysis may give an incomplete picture of charter eectiveness. Second,
since the observational analysis includes schools and cohorts without available lottery informa-
tion, we can use this approach to generate more precise school-specic estimates.
Observational Framework
Our observational estimates use a combination of matching and regression to control for observed
dierences between students attending dierent types of schools. Specically, students attending
lottery-eligible charters are matched to a control sample with the same baseline school, baseline
year, sex, race, limited English prociency status, special education status, and subsidized lunch
status. Charter students are matched if they fall into a cell that includes at least one regular
public school student; likewise, regular public school students are matched if they fall into in
a cell that includes at least one student in an eligible charter school. Therefore, every charter
student in the matched sample is compared to at least one demographically similar student from
the same cohort and sending school. This procedure yields matches for 77 percent of students
in eligible charter schools.
Within the matched sample, causal eects (denoted o) are estimated using the following
model for student i from cell c, observed in grade g in year t:
yigtc = t + g + c + b0
i + S0
igtso + igts (14)
Sigtc is a vector of years spent in schools of various types (eligible charter schools, ineligible
charter schools, alternative schools, and exam schools in urban and non-urban areas) for student
i from baseline through year t, and bi is a vector of student i's baseline scores on math, ELA, and
(in high school) Writing Topic and Writing Composition tests. Importantly, these models also
include xed eects for the cells constructed in the matching procedure (represented by c), so
that the observational regressions implicitly compare the outcomes of demographically similar
18students from the same sending schools and cohorts who later spend dierent amounts of time
in charter schools. The middle school analysis looks at eects on test scores in grades 5 through
8, while the high school analysis looks at 10th grade scores. Standard errors are clustered as in
the lottery analysis.
The comparison of observational and lottery-based estimates is encouraging. Table 12 re-
ports estimates of a version of equation (14) that distinguish between eligible charter schools
with and without usable lottery records. As shown in columns (1) and (2), observational esti-
mates for schools in the urban lottery sample are strikingly similar to the lottery results. For
example, the observational regressions suggest that a year in an urban lottery school increases
middle school scores by 0:17 and 0:28 in ELA and math; the corresponding lottery-based
estimates are 0:14 and 0:34. The observational and lottery estimates for urban charter high
schools are also close. These results suggest that the combination of matching and regression
accounts for much of the selection into charter attendance in urban areas, an important nd-
ing in its own right. Interestingly, estimates for non-lottery urban schools are smaller than
the corresponding estimates for lottery schools; for middle school, the estimates for non-lottery
schools are negative and statistically signicant. This is further evidence of the importance of
school-level heterogeneity in charter attendance eects.
Among estimates of attendance eects at eligible non-urban charter schools, the match be-
tween lottery estimates and observational results for schools with lottery records is not as good
as for urban schools, though the two research designs generate qualitatively similar conclusions.
For middle schools, estimated eects are negative using both lottery-based and observational
techniques, but the observational estimates are considerably smaller. Observational estimates
for high schools suggest small positive eects of non-urban charter attendance, while the lot-
tery estimates are negative (though imprecise). Observational estimates for non-urban middle
schools are reasonably similar across the lottery and non-lottery samples. Since both of the eli-
gible non-urban high schools are part of the lottery sample, estimates for non-urban non-lottery
high schools are not reported.
Explaining School-Specic Eects
Lottery and observational identication strategies generate broadly similar estimates in the
sample of schools where they can be compared. This nding motivates an analysis of school-
specic treatment eects estimated with observational techniques. The school-specic estimates
come from a version of equation (14) that includes separate variables measuring years spent in
each eligible charter school. These estimates are then linked to school policies and characteristics
19using the following school-level regression:
^ s = 0 + 1Us + 2Ls + 3Hs + P0
s4 + us; (15)
where ^ s is an observational estimate of the eect of charter school s, Us is an urban dummy,
Ls is a lottery sample dummy, Hs is a high school dummy, and Ps is a vector of school policies
and characteristics measured in our survey. The estimates of this equation are weighted by
the reciprocal of the standard error of the estimated treatment eect. Standard errors are
clustered at the school level to account for the fact that some schools contribute both middle
and high-school estimates to the sample.
Not surprisingly given our earlier ndings, estimates of equation (14) show substantially
larger treatment efects at urban and lottery sample schools. These eects are reported in
columns (1) and (5) of Table 13, which show estimates of equation (15) including only Us,
Ls, and Hs on the right-hand side. Eligible urban schools produce achievement gains that are
0:20 and 0:12 larger than the eects of non-urban schools in math and ELA; lottery-sample
schools generate gains that are 0:15 and 0:10 larger than the eects of non-lottery schools.
Columns (2) and (4) add instruction time (minutes per day and in the relevant subject) and per-
pupil expenditures to the model. Increased time in the classroom is increasingly promoted as a
means of increasing student achievement; in 2006, the Massachusetts state legislature approved
a program to extend the school day by two hours in a small set of schools, motivated in part
by the long days at successful charter schools (Pennington, 2007). The achievement eects of
per-pupil expenditures are of longstanding interest to researchers and policy-makers; increasing
per-pupil expenditures in regular public schools is often seen as an alternative to more structural
reforms (Hanushek, 1997). School-environment variables can indeed account for a substantial
fraction of the larger treatment eects produced by urban and lottery sample charter schools:
urban and lottery coecients fall substantially for both subjects, though the urban ELA and
lottery math coecients remain statistically signicant. On the other hand, only the total time
variable generates a marginally signicant eect, while the expenditure coecient is essentially
zero.
Extended learning time is one of a number of features of the No Excuses approach. The
estimates in columns (3) and (7) of Table 13 come from models that swap a dummy for schools
that subscribe to No Excuses for the school environment variables used to construct the esti-
mates reported in columns (2) and (6).14 No Excuses status fully accounts for the urban and
lottery advantages in both math and ELA, without controlling for other features of the school
environment. No Excuses charter schools generate math and ELA gains that are 0:31 and
14The No Excuses variable used for this exercise is coded as one for schools described by survey respondents as
fully or somewhat No Excuses. Results using a dummy for full No Excuses status only are similar.
200:17 larger than the eects of other charters. As shown in columns (4) and (8), the addition of
school environment variables pulls the No Excuses eects down somewhat, but their inclusion
does not change the basic story, and these variables do not themselves generate statistically
signicant eects conditional on No Excuses status.
Discipline
Comportment and discipline are often said to be dening features of No Excuses charter schools;
if urban charter eectiveness is due to the No Excuses approach, we might therefore expect to
see a marked impact on disciplinary outcomes. Table 14 reports 2SLS estimates of equation
(1) for suspensions and truancy in the year following applicant lotteries. The results for urban
schools, reported in columns (1) through (3), are striking. Urban charter attendance is estimated
to increase suspensions by 0.88 days in middle school and more than a full day in high school.
These treatment eects exceed mean suspension rates in the lottery sample (0.62 days for middle
school and 0.44 days for high school). The estimates for both middle and high school show
signicant increases in out-of-school suspensions, and smaller (though still substantial) increases
in in-school suspensions. Though less precise, the results for truancy suggest that attendance
at an urban charter high school reduces days of unauthorized absence { the truancy eect is
statistically signicant in models that include baseline test score controls. The truancy estimates
for middle school are not signicantly dierent from zero.
In contrast with the estimated eects of urban charter attendance on discipline, the estimates
for non-urban charter schools show little eect. Non-urban estimates, reported in columns (4)
through (6) of Table 14, are small, and none are signicantly dierent from zero. These results
sharpen the distinction between urban and non-urban charters. Attendance at urban No Excuses
charter schools produces large eects on discipline as well as achievement; attendance at other
charter schools has little eect in either domain.15
VI Conclusions
Massachusetts' urban charter schools generate large achievement gains, while non-urban char-
ters appear to be largely ineective and appear to reduce achievement for some. Candidate
explanations for this constellation of ndings include the fact that urban charter schools serve
larger shares of minority students in districts where the surrounding achievement level is gen-
15Observational estimates of eects on discipline closely match the lottery estimates for schools in the lottery
sample. Observational estimates in the sample of all eligible schools suggest that urban non-lottery schools have
much smaller eects on suspensions than do urban lottery schools, though discipline eects at non-lottery schools
are also positive.
21erally low, keep their students in school longer, spend more money per-pupil, and are much
more likely to identify with the No Excuses instructional approach than are non-urban schools.
Our analysis examines the contribution of these student- and school-level factors to the urban
charter advantage.
Massachusetts' urban charter schools, including the over-subscribed schools at the heart of
our lottery analysis, serve a typical urban population with non-charter achievement below the
average in non-urban areas. On average, urban charters push their students well beyond ambient
non-charter achievement in central cities, while non-urban charter schools leave their students'
achievement essentially unchanged or diminished from a higher starting point. Urban charter
schools are most eective for minorities, poor students, and low baseline achievers, so part of
the urban charter advantage can be explained by student demographics. On the other hand,
non-urban charter schools fail to boost achievement for any group.
Our analysis also reveals important heterogeneity within the set of urban schools. The
over-subscribed schools with well-documented admissions processes that make up our lottery
sample appear to be more eective than other urban charters. An analysis of school-specic
treatment eects suggests that adherence to the No Excuses paradigm can account for both the
urban and lottery-sample charter advantages. Learning time and per-pupil expenditures are not
strongly correlated with school-specic impacts and do not explain dierences in eectiveness
after accounting for No Excuses status. Consistent with a No Excuses explanation of the urban
charter advantage, the large achievement gains generated by urban charter schools are mirrored
by substantial eects on disciplinary outcomes in the urban sample.
The large negative estimates of non-urban charter impacts reported here raise the question of
why, despite their unimpressive achievement eects, many of these schools are over-subscribed.
One possibility is that parents misjudge the consequences of non-urban charter attendance.
In a related setting involving school choice, Rothstein (2006) argues that parental choice is
driven primarily by peer characteristics rather than school eectiveness. Of course, it's also
possible that non-urban charter schools generate gains that non-urban families value more than
the skills measured by the MCAS, especially in view of the fact that most non-urban students
do reasonably well in any case. Still, it seems unlikely that non-urban parents would see a
deterioration in basic skills as desirable. In ongoing work, we're looking at a variety of post-
secondary outcomes in an eort to determine whether the heterogeneous ndings for achievement
reported here have longer-term consequences. We also hope to investigate the eectiveness of



























Figure 1: Gaps in Treatment and No-Treatment Counterfactuals, Urban vs. Non 
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School level Urban status Boston status (1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle
Urban 35 21 16 9
Boston 13 10 8 7
Non-Boston 22 11 8 2
Nonurban 19 12 11 7
Total (Urban and Nonurban) 54 33 27 16
High
Urban 25 10 6 4
Boston 10 7 5 4
Non-Boston 15 3 1 0
Nonurban 12 3 2 2
Total (Urban and Nonurban) 37 13 8 6
**Here we also exclude one school that opened in 2009, but has a 4th grade entry so did not reach our observational outcome grades (5-8) by Fall 2009.
* There is an exception to the 9th grade entry criteria for high school. Two schools with lotteries at the middle school entry point which also enroll students in the 
high school grades are included in the lottery analysis of 10th grade outcomes.
Table 1: School Participation
Notes: This table reports the number of middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts and their participation in the observational and lottery studies. The 
numbered notes below describe the schools included in each column. Columns (2)-(4) exclude middle schools that have their main admissions lottery in elementary 
school (e.g., K-8 schools) and high schools that hold their main admissions lotteries in elementary or middle school (e.g.,K-12 or 6-12 schools). MATCH Charter 
Public School, Boston Collegiate Charter School, and Four Rivers Charter Public School are counted twice: once as a middle school and once as a high school 
(lotteries from each level participate in the lottery study). Edward Brooke Charter School is counted as a middle school (it became K-8 in 2006, only lotteries from the 
middle grades participate in the lottery study). "Urban" towns are defined by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education as the towns 
where the district superintendents participate in the Massachusetts Urban Superintendents Network. These towns include: Boston, Brockton, Cambridge, Chelsea, 
Chicopee, Everett, Fall River, Fitchburg, Framingham, Haverhill, Holyoke, Lawrence, Leominster, Lowell, Lynn, Malden, New Bedford, Pittsfield, Quincy, Revere, 
Somerville, Springfield, Taunton, and Worcester. 
1. Middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts, including schools opened in 2010 (which is too recent to have MCAS outcomes), alternative charter schools, 
2. Middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts with the designated entry grades (in  4-7 and  9)*, including schools opened in 2010, alternative schools, and 
3. Middle and high charter schools in Massachusetts with the designated entry grades (in  4-7 and  9)*, excluding closed schools, alternative schools, and schools 
4. Middle and high charter schools that are included in column (3), excluding schools that are undersubscribed or have insufficient lottery records.Statewide Urban Non-urban
Characteristic (1) (2) (3)
Years open 9.43 8.18 11.36
Days per year 186.18 188.53 182.55
Average minutes per day 447.86 464.35 422.36
Have Saturday school 0.321 0.471 0.091
Avg. math instruction (min) 80.93 94.56 59.86
Avg. reading instruction (min) 84.00 99.62 59.86
CMO or Network Affiliation 0.357 0.294 0.455
Fully or somewhat "No excuses" 0.429 0.706 0.000
Parent contract 0.679 0.824 0.455
Student contract 0.643 0.706 0.545
Uniforms 0.821 0.882 0.727
Reward and punishment system 0.464 0.647 0.182
Avg. per-pupil expenditure 12824.19 14095.53 11090.55
Title I eligible 0.857 1.000 0.636
Number of teachers 25.736 22.735 30.373
Student/teacher ratio 11.614 11.565 11.691
Licensed teachers 51.146 51.853 50.055
Proportion 32 and younger 0.577 0.709 0.384
Proportion 49 and older 0.129 0.058 0.233
Left voluntarily 2.278 1.969 2.727
Left involuntarily 1.296 1.500 1.000
Require staff to take calls after hours 0.071 0.059 0.091
Unpaid tutors/volunteers 0.786 0.706 0.909
Paid tutors 0.143 0.235 0.000
N (schools) 28 17 11
Table 2:  Characteristics of Charter Schools
Notes:  This table reports results from a survey of Massachusetts charter schools with entry in middle (4th-
7th) or high school (9th) grades.  The survey sample excludes schools closed prior to 2010, schools that 
were not open before Fall 2010, and schools serving non-traditional student populations.  Twenty-eight of 
32 eligible schools responded to the survey.Urban Non-urban Urban Non-urban Urban Non-urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.486 0.488 0.498 0.476 0.496 0.510
Black 0.185 0.027 0.407 0.036 0.479 0.022
Hispanic 0.314 0.036 0.237 0.048 0.234 0.025
Special education 0.190 0.163 0.166 0.160 0.176 0.184
Subsidized lunch 0.681 0.141 0.650 0.216 0.686 0.102
Limited English proficiency 0.150 0.016 0.077 0.025 0.086 0.008
Baseline Math score -0.430 0.213 -0.339 0.239 -0.352 0.306
Baseline ELA score -0.464 0.234 -0.330 0.261 -0.373 0.392
Years in charter 0.000 0.000 2.027 1.960 1.341 1.002
N (students) 153374 369866 6625 8316 4126 1693
N (schools) 262 390 16 11 9 7
Female 0.500 0.494 0.555 0.549 0.549 0.539
Black 0.190 0.028 0.535 0.020 0.615 0.029
Hispanic 0.272 0.032 0.176 0.010 0.256 0.017
Special education 0.169 0.155 0.160 0.105 0.174 0.115
Subsidized lunch 0.606 0.122 0.600 0.146 0.716 0.120
Limited English proficiency 0.093 0.009 0.022 0.005 0.035 0.003
Baseline Math score -0.420 0.271 -0.413 0.322 -0.315 0.445
Baseline ELA score -0.387 0.282 -0.325 0.413 -0.306 0.562
Years in charter 0.000 0.000 1.765 1.797 0.627 1.292
N (students) 116593 313366 2198 783 2973 349
N (schools) 101 304 8 2 4 2
Notes:  This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of public school students (columns 1 and 2), the sample of students in 
eligible charter schools (columns 3 and 4), and the sample of charter applicants (columns 5 and 6) from 2002-2010.  The sample is 
restricted to students in Massachusetts public schools at baseline with at least one followup test score.  The number of schools in 
columns (1) and (2) is counted in 6th grade for middle school and 10th grade for high school.  Years in charter school is measured 
through 8th grade for middle school and 10th grade for high school.
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics
Regular Public Schools Charter schools (eligible) Charter applicants (lottery)
Panel B.  High Schools (10th grade)
Panel A.  Middle Schools (5th-8th grade)First Stage Reduced Form Just identified Overidentified
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Middle ELA 0.987*** 0.065** 0.066** 0.062**
(0.043) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
N 12126
Math 0.984*** 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.175***
(0.043) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031)
N 12346
High ELA 0.509*** 0.113** 0.221*** 0.190**
(0.101) (0.050) (0.076) (0.074)
N 3303
Math 0.510*** 0.164** 0.322*** 0.269***
(0.101) (0.064) (0.090) (0.093)
N 3255
Writing Topic 0.514*** 0.156*** 0.303*** 0.290***
(0.101) (0.057) (0.087) (0.080)
N 3268
Writing Composition 0.514*** 0.140** 0.271*** 0.227***
(0.101) (0.058) (0.092) (0.085)
N 3268
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 4:  Lottery Results for Massachusetts Charter Schools
Notes:  This table reports estimates of the effects of years in charter schools on test scores.  The sample is restricted 
to students with baseline demographic characteristics who attended a Massachusetts public school when tested, and 
excludes students with sibling priority and late applicants.  Columns (1)-(3) are produced by a 2SLS procedure 
using a lottery offer dummy as an instrument for years spent in charter schools.  Column (4) uses risk set and offer 
interactions as instruments.  All models control for race, sex, special education, limited English proficiency, 
subsidized lunch status, and a female by minority dummy.  Year of birth, year of test, and risk set dummies are also 
included.  Middle school regressions pool post-lottery outcomes from 4th through 8th grade and cluster by student 
identifier as well as school-grade-year.  High school regressions include only scores for 10th grade and cluster by 
school-grade-year.
2SLSFirst Stage Reduced Form 2SLS First Stage Reduced Form 2SLS
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Middle ELA 1.001*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.978*** -0.155*** -0.156***
(0.055) (0.035) (0.033) (0.081) (0.045) (0.045)
N 8762 3364
Math 0.990*** 0.333*** 0.336*** 0.996*** -0.159*** -0.155***
(0.054) (0.038) (0.036) (0.081) (0.050) (0.051)
N 9015 3331
High ELA 0.494*** 0.117** 0.236*** 1.082*** -0.014 -0.009
(0.105) (0.051) (0.079) (0.153) (0.116) (0.105)
N 2954 349
Math 0.495*** 0.178*** 0.359*** 1.088*** -0.274* -0.246*
(0.105) (0.066) (0.092) (0.158) (0.162) (0.148)
N 2910 345
Writing Topic 0.500*** 0.166*** 0.332*** 1.082*** -0.157 -0.139
(0.105) (0.058) (0.090) (0.153) (0.222) (0.204)
N 2920 348
Writing Composition 0.500*** 0.149** 0.298*** 1.082*** -0.155 -0.137
(0.105) (0.060) (0.096) (0.153) (0.213) (0.196)
N 2920 348
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 5:  Lottery Results for Urban and Non-urban Charter Schools
Notes:  This table reports estimates of the effects of years in urban and non-urban charter schools on test scores.  The sample is restricted to students 
with baseline demographic characteristics who attended a Massachusetts public school when tested, and excludes students with sibling priority and late 
applicants.  Estimates are produced by a 2SLS procedure using urban and non-urban lottery offers as instruments for attendance at urban and non-urban 
charter schools. All models control for race, sex, special education, limited English proficiency, subsidized lunch status, and a female by minority 
dummy.  Year of birth, year of test, and risk set dummies are also included.  Middle school regressions pool post-lottery outcomes from 4th through 8th 
grade and cluster by student identifier as well as school-grade-year.  High school regressions include only scores for 10th grade, and cluster by school-
grade-year.
Non-urban UrbanFemale Male Black Hispanic White
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Middle ELA 0.110** 0.171*** 0.222*** 0.218*** 0.023 0.189*** 0.307***
(0.044) (0.047) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.039) (0.074)
N 4405 4357 4152 1960 1982 5945 2082
Math 0.394*** 0.287*** 0.502*** 0.378*** 0.109* 0.365*** 0.420***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.059) (0.060) (0.064) (0.041) (0.064)
N 4535 4480 4312 2015 2014 6112 2148
High ELA 0.172* 0.272** 0.222** 0.302* 0.047 0.191** 0.251
(0.101) (0.115) (0.087) (0.174) (0.629) (0.088) (0.165)
N 1625 1329 1817 756 227 2118 621
Math 0.400*** 0.306** 0.384*** 0.189 0.641 0.298*** 0.450***
(0.122) (0.132) (0.101) (0.210) (0.495) (0.104) (0.132)
N 1600 1310 1791 743 226 2086 679
Writing Topic 0.320*** 0.317*** 0.452*** -0.188 0.116 0.271** 0.358**
(0.119) (0.110) (0.097) (0.239) (0.665) (0.106) (0.150)
N 1611 1309 1794 747 225 2093 679
0.231* 0.348*** 0.369*** 0.128 0.460 0.227** 0.347*
(0.124) (0.131) (0.106) (0.249) (0.582) (0.114) (0.181)
N 1611 1309 1794 747 225 2093 679
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Notes:  This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of time spent in charter schools for various subgroups of students.  All regressions include year dummies, grade 
dummies, risk set dummies, and demographic controls.  Middle school standard errors are clustered on student identifier as well as school-grade-year.  High school standard 
errors are clustered by school-grade-year.







Sex RaceFemale Male Black Hispanic White
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Middle ELA -0.202*** -0.117* 0.148 -0.151 -0.156*** -0.196* -0.215***
(0.058) (0.068) (0.587) (0.273) (0.046) (0.118) (0.077)
N 1702 1662 67 94 3043 308 795
Math -0.220*** -0.105 0.153 -0.577 -0.138*** -0.168 -0.251***
(0.067) (0.073) (0.626) (0.381) (0.049) (0.157) (0.075)
N 1687 1644 65 96 3009 298 716
High ELA 0.166 -0.267 - - -0.022 -0.579*** -0.031
(0.122) (0.183) (0.109) (0.208) (0.135)
N 188 161 325 42 76
Math -0.193 -0.347 - - -0.247 -0.052 -0.081
(0.165) (0.239) (0.166) (0.049) (0.059)
N 187 158 322 40 74
Writing Topic 0.073 -0.480 - - -0.180 -2.713*** -0.396**
(0.178) (0.392) (0.200) (0.102) (0.167)
N 187 161 325 41 74
0.022 -0.379 - - -0.161 -1.320*** -0.293
(0.262) (0.312) (0.194) (0.191) (0.386)
N 187 161 325 41 74
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Sex Race





Notes:  This table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of time spent in non-urban charter schools for various subgroups of students.  All regressions include year dummies, grade 
dummies, risk set dummies, and demographic controls.  Middle school standard errors are clustered on student identifier as well as school-grade-year.  High school standard 
errors are clustered by school-grade-year.
Subsidized 
lunchUrban effect Non-urban effect Effect difference ϒ0 ϒ1
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Middle ELA 0.154** -0.218*** 0.371*** -0.705*** -0.333***
(0.074) (0.054) (0.092) (0.081) (0.065)
N 3817 1851 5668 5668 5668
Math 0.468*** -0.252*** 0.720*** -0.628*** 0.092
(0.084) (0.072) (0.111) (0.085) (0.071)
N 4127 1768 5895 5895 5895
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 8:  Urban Gaps in Treatment and No-treatment Counterfactuals
Notes:  This table estimates the components of the difference in charter treatment effects by urban status due to differences in non-charter 
"fallback" and differences in treated outcomes.  Outcomes are test scores the year after the lottery.  Columns (1) and (2) display urban and 
non-urban charter treatment effects, respectively, and column (3) gives the difference.  Column (4) shows an estimate of the difference in 
average non-treated outcomes between urban and non-urban compliers, computed as described in the text.  Column (5) shows an estimate 
of the difference in treated outcomes between these two groups.





School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Middle ELA 0.152** -0.417*** 0.116* 0.268*** -0.273*** -0.028 0.124**
(0.074) (0.013) (0.062) (0.058) (0.037) (0.047) (0.061)
N 102238 3752
Math 0.470*** -0.402*** 0.071 0.540*** -0.318*** -0.014 0.456***
(0.085) (0.012) (0.054) (0.062) (0.034) (0.041) (0.071)
N 145925 4062
High ELA 0.346** -0.368*** 0.026 0.372*** -0.300*** -0.073 0.285**
(0.166) (0.020) (0.104) (0.139) (0.034) (0.100) (0.142)
N 129062 3256
Math 0.647*** -0.373*** 0.002 0.639*** -0.277*** -0.117 0.533***
(0.175) (0.023) (0.116) (0.175) (0.046) (0.115) (0.174)
N 127196 3210
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Non-applicants included
Notes:  This table compares non-treated potential outcomes for compliers vs. non-attenders in urban areas.  For lottery applicants, outcomes are test scores in the year after the 
lottery for middle school and in 10th grade for high school.   For non-applicants, outcomes are 6th grade scores in middle school, and 10th grade scores in high school. The 
treatment is a dummy for charter attendance.  Column (1) presents 2SLS estimates of the effect of charter attendance on test scores, with the lottery offer dummy interacted 
with risk sets as instruments and risk sets as maintained controls.  Column (2) shows average test scores for non-charter students, including non-applicants.    Column (3) 
shows the difference between the average non-charter scores of compliers and non-charter students.  Column (4) shows the difference between the treated outcomes of 
compliers and the scores of non-charter students.  Columns (5)-(7) exclude non-applicants. 
Table 9:  Non-treated Gaps in Urban Areas






School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Middle ELA -0.198*** 0.265*** 0.124** -0.078** 0.392*** 0.010 -0.207***
(0.050) (0.007) (0.050) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.043)
N 273443 1851
Math -0.234*** 0.238*** 0.060 -0.192*** 0.304*** -0.006 -0.258***
(0.073) (0.007) (0.063) (0.039) (0.041) (0.047) (0.055)
N 326982 1768
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Notes:  This table compares non-treated potential outcomes for compliers vs. non-attenders in non-urban areas.  For lottery applicants, outcomes are test scores in the year after 
the lottery for middle school and in 10th grade for high school.   For non-applicants, outcomes are 6th grade math scores in middle school, and 10th grade scores in high 
school. The treatment is a dummy for charter attendance.  Column (1) presents 2SLS estimates of the effect of charter attendance on test scores, with the lottery offer dummy 
interacted with risk sets as instruments and risk sets as maintained controls.  Column (2) shows average test scores for non-charter students, including non-applicants.    
Column (3) shows the difference between the average non-charter scores of compliers and non-charter students.  Column (4) shows the difference between the treated 
outcomes of compliers and the scores of non-charter students.  Columns (5)-(7) exclude non-applicants. 
Table 10:  Non-treated Gaps in Non-urban Areas
Non-applicants excluded Non-applicants included Treatment 
EffectUrban vs. non-urban 
difference in TE
Due to diffs in 
cov. levels
Due to diffs in cov-
specific TE
Due to diffs in 
cov. levels
Due to diffs in cov-
specific TE
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Middle ELA 0.403*** 0.252*** 0.151 0.057 0.345
(0.079) (0.086) (0.104) (0.399) (0.436)
N 4523
Math 0.675*** 0.329*** 0.346*** 0.248 0.428
(0.074) (0.081) (0.093) (0.333) (0.353)
N 4521
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 11:  Decomposition of Urban Differences in Impact
Decomposition 1 (urban loading) Decomposition 2 (non-urban loading)
Notes:  This table decomposes the difference between urban and non-urban charter treatment effects.  Outcomes are test scores the year after the lottery.  
The treatment is a dummy for charter attendance.  Column (1) shows the difference in urban vs. non-urban treatment effects, computed as described in the 
text.  Columns (2) and (3) report the components of the urban/non-urban difference due to differences in covariate levels and differences in covariate-
specific effects, respectively, weighting the difference in covariate levels by the urban treatment effects.  Columns (4) and (5) report a decomposition that 
weights the difference in covariate levels by the non-urban treatment effects.  The covariates used in the decompositions are race, sex, special education, 
limited English proficiency, free/reduced price lunch, and baseline score categories (advanced, proficient, needs improvement, warning) in math and ELA.Lottery estimate Lottery sample
Non-lottery 
sample Lottery estimate Lottery sample
Non-lottery 
sample
School level Subject (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Middle ELA 0.140*** 0.174*** -0.035*** -0.156*** -0.015** -0.019
(0.033) (0.011) (0.012) (0.045) (0.007) (0.012)
N 8762 64792 64792 3364 139101 139101
Math 0.336*** 0.277*** -0.035** -0.155*** -0.032*** -0.013
(0.036) (0.013) (0.015) (0.051) (0.007) (0.010)
N 9015 67926 67926 3331 145902 145902
High ELA 0.236*** 0.247*** 0.082*** -0.009 0.050*** -
(0.079) (0.019) (0.018) (0.105) (0.014)
N 2954 5011 5011 349 9441
Math 0.359*** 0.305*** -0.019 -0.246* 0.039** -
(0.092) (0.036) (0.017) (0.148) (0.019)
N 2910 4916 4916 345 9401
Writing Topic 0.332*** 0.272*** 0.083*** -0.139 0.051*** -
(0.090) (0.029) (0.028) (0.204) (0.020)
N 2920 4932 4932 348 9404
Writing Composition 0.298*** 0.256*** 0.072** -0.137 0.038* -
(0.096) (0.025) (0.032) (0.196) (0.022)
N 2920 4932 4932 348 9404
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Table 12:  Comparison of Lottery and Observational Estimates for Eligible Charters
Urban Non-urban
Notes:  This table reports estimates of the effects of years in charter schools on test scores.  Eligible charters are schools with entry grades 4-7 (middle) or 9 (high), and 
that meet the other restrictions from Table 1.  The sample is produced by matching charter students to students in traditional public schools on cells defined by sending 
school, baseline year, and baseline demographics (race, sex, limited English proficiency, special education status, and free lunch status).  All models control for cell fixed 
effects, year effects, grade effects, and baseline test scores.  Middle school regressions pool outcomes from 5th through 8th grade and cluster by student identifier as well 
Observational estimates Observational estimatesVariable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Urban 0.198*** 0.072 0.008 -0.041 0.120*** 0.062* 0.011 0.014
(0.057) (0.082) (0.062) (0.053) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033) (0.042)
Total minutes per day/100 - 0.154* 0.095 - 0.080* - 0.055
(0.090) (0.078) (0.042) (0.038)
Minutes in relevant subject/100 - 0.203 - 0.207 - 0.023 - 0.007
(0.211) (0.168) (0.075) (0.068)
Per-pupil expenditure/1000 - -0.002 - -0.009 - 0.004 - -0.001
(0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
School is No Excuses - - 0.306*** 0.231*** - - 0.169*** 0.117**
(0.082) (0.060) (0.045) (0.048)
Lottery 0.154** 0.086* 0.051 0.038 0.101** 0.055 0.047 0.033
(0.069) (0.050) (0.052) (0.041) (0.043) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033)
High School 0.039 0.078 0.035 0.087 0.069* 0.076* 0.062* 0.078*
(0.071) (0.065) (0.052) (0.057) (0.036) (0.040) (0.032) (0.040)
Constant -0.131* -0.835** -0.064 -0.490 -0.085* -0.445** -0.047 -0.267
(0.067) (0.375) (0.043) (0.299) (0.045) (0.176) (0.033) (0.183)
N 30 28 30 28 30 28 30 28
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Notes:  This table reports regressions of school-specific treatment effects on school characteristics.  The sample includes only schools that completed the charter 
survey.  Regressions weight by the inverse of the standard error of the coefficient estimates and cluster at the school level.






School level Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Middle Total days suspended 0.621 0.881*** 0.861*** 0.074 -0.015 -0.013
(0.102) (0.100) (0.041) (0.042)
N 3919 3812 1701 1571
0.085 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.010 -0.022 -0.026
(0.044) (0.045) (0.016) (0.016)
N 3919 3812 1701 1571
0.536 0.688*** 0.669*** 0.064 0.008 0.013
(0.085) (0.083) (0.033) (0.033)
N 3919 3812 1701 1571
Days truant 0.520 0.143 0.133 0.068 -0.039 -0.035
(0.216) (0.219) (0.053) (0.056)
N 3919 3812 1701 1571
High Total days suspended 0.436 1.215*** 1.251*** 0.133 -0.251 -0.250
(0.212) (0.215) (0.269) (0.309)
N 3006 2868 377 327
0.070 0.100* 0.104* 0.045 0.054 0.054
(0.057) (0.058) (0.037) (0.044)
N 3006 2868 377 327
0.366 1.115*** 1.147*** 0.088 -0.305 -0.304
(0.196) (0.198) (0.262) (0.322)
N 3006 2868 377 327
Days truant 0.621 -0.458 -0.808** 0.231 0.087 0.462
(0.436) (0.354) (0.175) (0.347)
N 3006 2868 377 327
Days of out-of-school 
suspension
Notes:  This table reports 2SLS regressions of disciplinary outcomes the year after the lottery on dummies for urban and non-urban charter 
attendance instrumented by the urban and non-urban offer dummies.  All regressions include year dummies, year of birth dummies, grade dummies, 
and demographics; columns (3) and (6) add baseline score controls.  Standard errors are clustered by school-grade-year.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
Urban Non-urban
Table 14:  Effects on Discipline
Days of in-school 
suspension
Days of out-of-school 
suspension
Days of in-school 
suspensionData Appendix
The data used for this study come from charter school lottery records, student demographic and
school attendance information in the Massachusetts Student Information Management System
(SIMS), and test scores from the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)
database. This appendix describes each data source and details the procedures used to clean
and match them. The steps used here are an updated version of the methods described in the
data appendix to Angrist et al. (2010).
A Data Sets
A.1 Charter School Entrance Lotteries
Data description and sample restrictions
Our sample of applicants is obtained from records of lotteries held at 19 Massachusetts charter
schools between 2002 and 2008. The participating schools and lottery years are listed in Table
A1, along with schools eligible for the lottery study that did not contribute records. A total of
84 school-specic entry cohorts are included in the analysis. Lotteries at three schools contribute
observations to both the middle and high school samples.
The raw lottery records typically include applicants' names, dates of birth, contact infor-
mation, and other information used to dene lottery groups, such as sibling and out-of-area
status. The rst ve rows in each panel of Table A4 show the sample restrictions we impose
on the raw lottery records, separately by lottery cohort and school level. We exclude duplicate
applicants and applicants listed as applying to the wrong entry grade. We also drop late appli-
cants, out-of-area applicants, and sibling applicants, as these groups are typically not included
in the standard lottery process. Imposing these restrictions reduces the number of middle school
lottery records from 10,799 to 9,247 and reduces the number of high school records from 7,326
to 7,044.
Lottery oers
In addition to the data described above, the lottery records also include information regarding
oered seats. We used this information to reconstruct indicator variables for whether lottery
participants received randomized oers. At each school, records were sucient to determine the
students who were oered seats before the start of the school year following the lottery, including
initially waitlisted students who received oers after others declined. Some of the records also
indicate students who were initially oered seats on the day of the lottery; since this \initial
oer" information is not available for all schools, we code our oer variable to include oers
received by waitlisted students. The instrument Zi used in our analyses is one for any student
39who received an oer from a school included in our lottery sample at any time during the year
she applied. Oer rates were 66 percent and 64 percent in our middle and high school samples,
respectively.
A.2 Student Information Management System Data
Data description
Our study uses SIMS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2009-2010 school year.
Each year of data includes an October le and an end-of-year le. The SIMS records information
on demographics and schools attended for all students in Massachusetts' public schools. An
observation in the SIMS refers to a student in a school in a year, though there are some student-
school-year duplicates for students that switch grades or programs within a school and year.
Coding of demographics and attendance
The SIMS variables used in our analysis include grade, year, name, town of residence, date of
birth, sex, race, special education and limited English prociency status, free or reduced price
lunch, and school attended. We constructed a wide-format data set that captures demographic
and attendance information for every student in each year in which he or she is present in
Massachusetts' public schools. This le uses information from the longest-attended school in
the rst calendar year spent in each grade. Attendance ties were broken at random; this aects
only 0.007 percent of records. Students classied as SPED, LEP, or free/reduced price lunch in
any record within a school-year-grade retain that designation for the entire school-year-grade.
We measure charter school attendance in calendar years. A student is coded as attending a
charter school in a particular year when there is any SIMS record reporting charter attendance
in that year. Students who attend more than one charter school within a year are assigned to
the charter they attended longest.
A.3 Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System Data
Data description and sample restrictions
We use MCAS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2009-2010 school year. Each
observation in the MCAS database corresponds to a student's test results in a particular grade
and year. We use math and English Language Arts (ELA) tests in grades 3 through 8 and
10, as well as Writing Topic and Writing Composition scores in grades 4, 7, and 10. The test
score variables are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one within a subject-
grade-year in Massachusetts. Repetitions of the same test subject and grade are dropped. In
cases with multiple records within a year and grade, ties are broken at random; this aected
0.09 percent of MCAS records.
40In the lottery-based middle school analysis, all post-lottery test scores through 8th grade are
used as outcomes. High school outcomes are from 10th grade. The most recent pre-lottery score
in a subject denes a student's baseline score. For the observational analysis, outcome grades
are 5th through 8th for middle school 10th for high school; baseline scores are from 4th grade
for middle school and 7th or 8th grade for high school.
B Matching Data Sets
B.1 Match from the MCAS to the SIMS
The processed SIMS and MCAS les were merged by grade, year, and a state student identier
known as the SASID. Scores that could not be matched to the SIMS were dropped. This
restricted eliminated 0.7 percent of MCAS scores statewide.
B.2 Match from the Lottery Records to the State Database
Match procedure
Lottery records were matched to the state SIMS/MCAS database by name, application year,
and application grade. In some cases, this procedure did not produce a unique match. We
accepted some matches based on fewer criteria where the information on grade, year, and town
of residence seemed to make sense.
Match success rate
Our matching procedure successfully located most applicants in the SIMS database. Table A5
reports cohort-specic match rates from the lottery records to the combined SIMS/MCAS le,
separately for middle and high school. The overall match rates for middle and high school were
92.0 percent and 94.3 percent, respectively. Table A5 also reports separate match rates for
oered and non-oered students. In middle school, oered students were slightly more likely
to be matched (93.8 percent compared to 89.3 percent). Oered and non-oered applicants to
charter high schools were matched to the SIMS at almost identical rates (94.1 percent compared
to 94.8 percent).
C Construction of the Outcome Data Sets
C.1 Lottery Sample
Further sample restrictions
Once matched to the SIMS, each student is associated with a unique SASID; at this point,
we can therefore determine which students applied to multiple schools in our lottery sample.
41Following the match, we reshape the lottery data set to contain a single record for each student.
If students applied in more than one year to lotteries at a particular school level (middle or
high), we keep only the records associated with their rst year of application. In our basic
lottery analyses, we also exclude students without baseline demographics in the SIMS; in eect,
this rule limits the sample to students in Massachusetts' public schools at baseline. Rows 6-9 in
each panel of Table A4 report the impact of these restrictions on sample sizes for middle and
high school. The set of matched rst-time applicants with baseline demographics includes 6,214
middle school students and 4,207 high school students.
Final set of outcomes and students
To generate the middle school analysis le, the matched lottery/SIMS/MCAS le is reshaped
to long format, with each observation referring to a test score outcome for a student in a
particular year. The high school analysis le uses only 10th grade outcomes, so it includes a
single observation for each student. Table A6 summarizes the analysis les for middle and high
school. Columns (1) and (2) list the application and outcome grades for each cohort, and column
(3) lists the number of applicants satisfying the sample restrictions from Table A4. In middle
school, 5,773 of 6,214 students contribute at least one test score to the analysis. In high school,
3,322 of 4,207 students have at least one score. Middle school applicants contribute dierent
numbers of scores to the analysis depending on their years and grades of application; math
and ELA tests were not given in every middle school grade until 2006, and some cohorts are
not observed through 8th grade. Table A7 lists the grades and years in which math and ELA
subjects were administered. As shown in columns (5)-(8) of Table A6, we nd 12,346 out of
14,180 expected scores for middle school math, 12,126 of 13,904 for middle school ELA, 3,255
of 4,206 for high school math, and 3,303 of 4,206 for high school ELA. These outcomes are used
to produce the 2SLS estimates reported in Tables 4-7.
C.2 Observational Sample
To produce the analysis le used for the observational analysis, we begin with the matched
SIMS/MCAS state database. As described in Section V, we dene cells based on baseline
school, baseline year, race, and sex, separately for middle school and high school. We then
count the number of students in each cell who go on to spend time in eligible charter schools
and regular public schools in the relevant range of grades (5th through 8th for middle school
and 10th for high school). Observations in cells that do not include at least one student who
attends eligible charter schools and one student who attends regular public schools are dropped.
We then produce a long format data le containing the full set of test score outcomes for the
remaining sample of matched students at the relevant school level, as well as variables counting
years of attendance at each eligible charter school. This le is used to produce the observational
42estimates. Our matching procedure excludes 23 percent of students who attend eligible charter
schools in middle or high school.





Years in lottery 
study
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Academy of the Pacific Rim Charter School Boston Yes 5-12 Yes 2005-2009
Advanced Math and Science Academy Charter School Marlborough 6-12 Yes
Barnstable Horace Mann Charter School Marstons Mills 4-5 Yes
Berkshire Arts and Technology Charter Public School Adams 6-12 Yes
Boston Collegiate Charter School Boston Yes 5-12 Yes Yes 2002-2009
Boston Preparatory Charter Public School Boston Yes 6-11 Yes 2005-2009
Cape Cod Lighthouse Charter School Orleans 6-8 Yes 2007-2009
Christa McAuliffe Regional Charter Public School Framingham Yes 6-8 Yes
City on a Hill Charter Public School Boston Yes 9-12 Yes 2002, 2004-2008
Codman Academy Charter Public School Boston Yes 9-12 Yes 2004, 2008
Community Charter School of Cambridge Cambridge Yes 7-12 Yes
Edward Brooke Charter School Boston Yes K-8 Yes 2006-2009
Excel Academy Charter School Boston Yes 5-8 Yes 2008-2009
Four Rivers Charter Public School Greenfield 7-12 Yes Yes 2003-2009
Francis W Parker Charter Essential School Devins 7-12 Yes 2006-2009
Global Learning Charter Public School New Bedford Yes 5-12 Yes 2006-2007, 2009
Hampden Charter School of Science Chicopee Yes 6-10 Yes
Health Careers Academy Charter School Boston Yes 9-12 Yes
Innovation Academy Charter School Tyngsboro 5-11 Yes 2007-2009
KIPP Academy Lynn Lynn Yes 5-8 Yes 2005-2009
Marblehead Community Charter Public School Marblehead 4-8 Yes 2005-2007
MATCH Charter Public School Boston Yes 6-12 Yes Yes 2002-2009
New Leadership Charter School Springfield Yes 6-12 Yes
North Central Charter Essential School Fitchburg Yes 7-12 Yes
Phoenix Charter Academy Chelsea Yes 9-12 Yes
Pioneer Charter School of Science Everett Yes 7-11 Yes
Pioneer Valley Performing Arts Charter Public School South Hadley 7-12 Yes 2006-2009
Rising Tide Charter Public School Plymouth 5-8 Yes 2009
Roxbury Preparatory Charter School Boston Yes 6-8 Yes 2002-2009
Salem Academy Charter School Salem 6-12 Yes
Smith Leadership Academy Boston Yes 6-8 Yes
Sturgis Charter Public School Hyannis 9-12 Yes 2004, 2006, 2008
Table A1:  Massachusetts Charter Schools Eligible for the Lottery Study
Notes:  This table lists all charter schools in Massachusetts eligible for the lottery study.  To be counted as eligible, a school must be open in the relevant years and meet the entry grade and 
student population restrictions required for inclusion in column (3) of Table 1.All lotteries
Lotteries with 
baseline scores All lotteries
Lotteries with 
baseline scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.007 0.010 0.014 0.000
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019)
0.012 0.006 -0.002 0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.022)
-0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
0.016 0.018 0.008 0.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022)
0.007 0.008 0.020 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.020)
-0.010 -0.011 -0.002 -0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017)
-0.008 -0.006 0.014* 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
- 0.017 - -0.072*
(0.030) (0.037)
- 0.008 - -0.057
(0.030) (0.040)
- - - 0.023
(0.039)
- - - -0.063
(0.039)
p-value, from F-test 0.423 0.753 0.695 0.141
N 6214 5784 4207 3549
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A2:  Covariate Balance





Baseline Writing Composition Score
Baseline Writing Topic Score
Notes: This table reports coefficients on regressions of the variable indicated in each row on an indicator variable equal to one 
if the student won the lottery. Regressions include risk set dummies and baseline grade dummies and exclude students with 
sibling priority and late applicants. Samples in columns (1) and (3) are restricted to students from cohorts where we should 
observe at least one test score. Samples in columns (2) and (4) are restricted to students who also have baseline test scores. F 
tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on winning the lottery in all regressions are all equal to zero. These test 










School level Subject (1) (2) (3)
Middle ELA 0.911 0.016** 0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
N 2348 6214 5873
Math 0.916 0.011 0.007
(0.008) (0.008)
N 2348 6214 5805
High ELA 0.787 0.008 0.007
(0.017) (0.018)
N 1332 4207 3687
Math 0.773 0.010 0.004
(0.018) (0.018)
N 1332 4207 4060
0.773 0.010 0.003
(0.018) (0.019)
N 1332 4207 3620





Writing Topic and 
Writing Composition
Notes: This table reports coefficients on regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if a student has a followup 
test score on an indicator variable equal to one if the student won the lottery. Regressions in columns (2) and (3) 
include risk set dummies as well as demographic variables, year of birth dummies, year of baseline dummies, and 
baseline grade dummies. Regressions in column (3) add baseline test scores. The sample is restricted to students who 
participated in an effective lottery from cohorts where we should observe follow-up scores. High school students who 
take Writing Topic exam must also take Writing Composition.2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 All lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total number of entry grade records 313 394 391 990 1578 2124 2132 2877 10799
Excluding disqualified applicants 313 394 391 990 1577 2106 2115 2873 10759
Excluding late applicants 313 391 390 972 1551 2046 2054 2829 10546
Excluding applicants from outside of area 313 387 388 963 1540 2028 2041 2741 10401
Excluding siblings 295 358 343 890 1378 1787 1801 2395 9247
Excluding records not matched to the SIMS 267 311 305 838 1311 1710 1669 2095 8506
Reshaping to one record per student 267 311 304 741 1115 1505 1424 1757 7424
Excluding repeat applications 267 308 302 728 1093 1470 1360 1705 7233
In Massachusetts public schools at baseline 201 228 222 600 919 1289 1187 1568 6214
Excluding students without a test score 187 208 208 569 875 1195 1104 1427 5773
Total number of entry grade records 775 717 1094 955 1063 1330 1392 - 7326
Excluding disqualified applicants 775 717 1090 954 1061 1327 1391 - 7315
Excluding late applicants 765 710 1062 951 1053 1327 1372 - 7240
Excluding applicants from outside of area 765 706 1060 947 1050 1327 1372 - 7227
Excluding siblings 732 677 1029 925 1049 1298 1334 - 7044
Excluding students not matched to the SIMS 645 614 966 872 1029 1251 1255 - 6632
Reshaping to one record per student 573 614 740 650 772 881 863 - 5093
Excluding repeat applications 573 612 736 645 750 865 851 - 5032
In Massachusetts public schools at baseline 406 462 631 553 642 782 731 - 4207
Excluding students without a test score 328 357 513 437 528 630 529 - 3322
Table A4:  Sample Restrictions for the Lottery Analysis
Lottery cohort
Panel A.  Middle School
Panel B.  High School
Notes:  This table summarizes the sample restrictions imposed for the lottery analysis.  Disqualified applications are defined as duplicate records and applications to the wrong grade.Total Offered Not offered
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4)
2002-2003 295 0.908 0.934 0.859
2003-2004 358 0.869 0.882 0.820
2004-2005 343 0.889 0.924 0.849
2005-2006 890 0.942 0.967 0.886
2006-2007 1378 0.951 0.962 0.933
2007-2008 1787 0.957 0.978 0.917
2008-2009 1801 0.927 0.958 0.881
2009-2010 2395 0.875 0.865 0.884
All 9247 0.920 0.938 0.893
2002-2003 732 0.898 0.911 0.831
2003-2004 677 0.907 0.879 0.932
2004-2005 1029 0.941 0.939 0.945
2005-2006 925 0.943 0.943 0.942
2006-2007 1049 0.981 0.986 0.975
2007-2008 1298 0.964 0.974 0.959
2008-2009 1334 0.941 0.939 0.951
All 7044 0.943 0.941 0.948
Table A5:  Match from Lottery Records to SIMS
Number of 
records
Fraction with SIMS match
Panel A.  Middle School
Panel B.  High School
Notes:  This table summarizes the match from the lottery records to the SIMS data.  







Number with a 
test score
Number of math 
scores expected
Number of ELA 
scores expected
Number of math 
scores observed
Number of ELA 
scores observed
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2002-2003 5-6 6-8 201 187 402 290 351 253
2003-2004 5-7 6-8 228 208 510 418 429 355
2004-2005 5-7 6-8 222 208 616 544 534 469
2005-2006 4-7 4-8 600 569 2104 2104 1874 1888
2006-2007 4-7 4-8 919 875 2944 2944 2547 2559
2007-2008 4-7 4-8 1289 1195 3662 3662 3101 3087
2008-2009 5-7 5-8 1187 1104 2374 2374 2093 2102
2009-2010 5-7 5-8 1568 1427 1568 1568 1417 1413
All 4-7 4-8 6214 5773 14180 13904 12346 12126
2002-2003 5,9 10 406 328 406 406 327 328
2003-2004 5,7,9 10 462 357 462 462 351 355
2004-2005 7,9 10 631 513 631 631 500 510
2005-2006 7,9 10 553 437 553 553 426 433
2006-2007 9 10 642 528 642 642 522 523
2007-2008 9 10 782 630 782 782 609 628
2008-2009 9 10 730 529 730 730 520 526
All 5,7,9 10 4206 3322 4206 4206 3255 3303
Table A6:  Outcome Data for the Lottery Analysis
Panel A.  Middle School
Panel B.  High School
Notes:  This table summarizes observed test score outcomes for charter school lottery applicants.  The sample is restricted to randomized applicants matched to 
baseline SIMS demographics.  Expected test scores are post-lottery scores in grades 4-8 for middle school and grade 10 for high school that would be taken in Spring 
2010 or earlier given normal academic progress after the lottery.  Table A1 lists the schools participating in each cohort and their entry grades.  Table A7 lists the 
availability of math and ELA tests by year.4th grade 5th grade 6th grade 7th grade 8th grade 10th grade
Subject School year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ELA 2001-2002 Yes Yes Yes
2002-2003 Yes Yes Yes
2003-2004 Yes Yes Yes
2004-2005 Yes Yes Yes
2005-2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2006-2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2007-2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2008-2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2009-2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Math 2001-2002 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2002-2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2003-2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2004-2005 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2005-2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2006-2007 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2007-2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2008-2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2009-2010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A7:  Availability of MCAS ELA and Math Tests by Year
Notes:  This table reports the years and grades in which MCAS ELA and math tests were administered between 2002 
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